"They are (1) to prevent a miscarriage of justice (2) when a change in law raises a new issue while an appeal is pending and (3) when the issue is purely one of law." Id. "We will review an issue that has been raised for the first time on appeal under certain narrow circumstances." Parks, 51 F.3d at 1488. For the first time on appeal, Kimes' argues that the Supremacy Clause prohibits the application of California's litigation privilege to bar a federal civil rights claim.We can affirm the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim on any basis fairly supported by the record. A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. A dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo.Thus, Kimes' complaint does not reveal that his § 1983 claim against the Attorney Defendants is barred by the statute of limitations. The complaint, filed in September 1994, alleges several times that Kimes had no knowledge of the alleged conspiracy between Judge Stone and the Attorney Defendants while it was occurring, and nothing in the complaint reveals that they "should have known" about it before June 1994. Kimes' complaint reveals that he learned of the alleged conspiracy that deprived him of his constitutional rights in mid-June 1994. Under federal law, "the limitations period accrues when a party knows or has reason to know of the injury" which is the basis of the cause of action. Thus, the limitations period forS 1983 claims in California is one year. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), we apply the statute of limitations for personal injury claims in the state in which the claim accrued. Because § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations provision, under Wilson v.8(a) does not provide a separate basis for affirming the district court. The complaint reveals (1) that Kimes suffered, inter alia, a loss of a certain property right in his father's estate, (2) that he was deprived of this property right by the Attorney Defendants acting in conjunction with Judge Stone, and (3) that an extra-judicial agreement between the Attorney Defendants and Judge Stone and the allegedly fraudulent court proceeding circumvented the "due course of justice." Compl. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. Kimes' complaint fairly satisfies this requirement, by, at a minimum, making specific allegations which could establish the elements of a § 1983 claim based upon procedural due process: (1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government and (3) lack of process.
All that is required is that the complaint gives "the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon which it rests." Datagate, Inc.
Rule 8(f) indicates that "ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), requiring "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," does not provide a separate ground for affirming the district court.
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